求两篇关于养老院养老现状方面的外文文献，要有出处（如期刊、论文等）m,急需一篇关于城市养老机构的文献综述谢谢

韦楼

阳光总在风雨后

1年前

1、求两篇关于养老院养老现状方面的外文文献，要有出处（如期刊、论文等）m

《养老院老人的心理护理》李彦林编夕阳无限 : 世界当代养老院与老年公寓设计（国内唯一一本关于养老院的大码洋画册）作　　者：凤凰空间·北京。

2、急需一篇关于城市养老机构的文献综述谢谢

http://shfl.mca.gov.cn/article/llyj/shhyj/200812/200812000255

15、shtml。

3、求关于失地农民养老保障方面的英文文献，最好是有翻译的。急~

太长了发不上来啊。

4、求关于养老保险制度方面的国外的著作论文开题的文献综述要用

这个不难的，亲。

5、20 求一篇关于养老模式选择的英文文献原文和泽文，3000字左右，谢谢！

养老保险制度中英文对照外文翻译文献原文: Reintroducing Intergenerational Equilibrium: Key Concepts behind the New Polish Pension System By: Marek Góra William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 574 June 2003 Abstract Poland adopted a new pension system in 199

9、 This new pension system allows Poland to reduce pension expenditure (as a percent of GDP), instead of increasing it as is projected for the majority of other OECD countries. This paper presents the conceptual background of the new system design. The new system’s long-term bjective is to ensure intergenerational equilibrium irrespective of the demographic situation. This requires stabilisation of the share of GDP allocated to the entire retired generation. Traditional pension systems aim, instead, at stabilisation of the share of GDP per retiree. The change in demographic structure observed over the past for a couple of decades and this historic attempt to stabilise the share of GDP per retiree led to severe fiscal problems and negative externalities for growth, as observed in numerous countries. Many countries have tried to reform their pension systems in different ways to try to resolve the issue of these ever-increasing costs. Although the Polish reform uses a number of techniques applied elsewhere, its design differs from the typical approaches – and the lessons and results are promising for all OECD countries. This paper presents the theoretical and practical application of this alternative approach and as such, the key features of the new Polish pension system design. Introduction Demographic transition together with myopic policies has caused severe problems in the area of pensions in many countries around the world. Elements of traditional pension systems’ design include a weak link of benefits to contributions and the lack of control over costs of the system. Inclusion of these elements in the pension system design led to the explosion of costs, caused negative externalities for growth and contributed to persistently high unemployment. As such, the quest for pension reform is now on the top of policy agendas around the world, and especially in Europe. However, very few countries have been able to introduce fundamental reforms in the area of pensions to this time. In this case, the definition of reform is crucial. For the purposes of this paper, “reform” means changing the system in order to remove tructural inefficiencies – and not just playing at the margins with contribution rates and retirement ages to adjust the system’s parameters for short-term fiscal and political reasons.Traditional pension systems have proven to be inefficient in providing societies with social security. At the same time attempts to cure these systems are hampered by a lack of consensus on what could replace the traditional system. Discussions on this issue involve confusion stemming from the ideological context of the discussion participants, as well as from overuse of such concepts as “pay-as-you-go” versus “funding”, or “public” versus “private”, while at the same time ignoring a number of important economic issues. Furthermore, economists have traditionally ignored pensions. Designing and running pension systems was left to non-economists, who were not extensively concerned with how to finance pensions in the long-term or with how to counteract these pension systems’ negative externalities. The new Polish pension system belongs to very small number of successful attempts to apply modern thinking in the area of pensions. This does not mean – as some may assume – giving up social security goals. Rather, the key idea was to give up the inefficient methods of delivering social security in order to save its goals and principles. This paper consists of two parts. The first focuses on a discussion of general issues that need to be addressed when designing a pension system. These issues are presented in a way that goes beyond the traditional way of thinking on pensions. In regards to this second part of the paper, it is important to point out that most countries in the current EU member states and candidate countries have pension systems that are essentially the same at the basic policy level. As such, the solutions in one member state or candidate country can be expected to be the same. Like Europeanension system design techniques used. The dualistic pay-as-you-go versus funded approach leaves aside the combination of individual participation in a system that does not use financial markets. This approach also neglects the fact that using financial markets means investment (pension portfolio consists of private equities) or deferring taxes (pension portfolio consists of government bonds), which is obviously not the same. Adding redistribution or financial markets to the pension system generates externalities. These externalities can be positive and negative. Redistribution within the pension system can generate positive externalities if the system is inexpensive, namely the part of GDP allocated to the retired generation is not large. If the redistribution is large, then it generates negative externalities, such as contributing to persistently high unemployment and weak growth. Using financial markets causes positive externalities for growth if the pension system spends contribution money on investment. If the contributions are spent on government debt they may lead to negative externalities similar to those of large redistributive system, namely more tax distortions. This can happen if the rate of return on government debt is persistently above the rate of GDP growth. There exists yet another option, namely to bring the pension system as close toeconomic neutrality as possible. This option requires, among other things, combining individual participation in the system with dividing GDP between generations based on real economy developments, such as has been done in Poland and Sweden. Demographic structure: consequences of the change .Irrespective of the pension system design technique used, the pension system exchanges a right of the retired generation for a part of the product of the working generation. The exchange can be organised in various ways and also the rights can be expressed in various ways. In particular, the rights can be either traded in the financial markets, or defined in relation to some economic variables, or just based on political promise. In all of these cases there is a kind of market for pension rights. The working generation finances contributions in order to purchase the rights; the retired generation sells the rights in order to get a part of the product of the working generation. The various types of pension systems create an institutional framework for this market. Given the contribution rate, the demand side of the market is determined by the number of workers and their productivity. The number of retirees determines the demand side. However, if – as it is the case in traditional systems – pensions are administratively defined in terms of wages (replacement rate promised) then the pension system depends solely on the demographic structure. Even strong productivity growth cannot help in balancing the system’s revenue and。